Separation kernel, a fundamental software of safety and security critical systems, provides to its hosted software applications high-assurance partitioning and information flow control properties. The application of separation kernel in critical domain demands the correctness of the kernel by formal verification. To our knowledge, there does not exist a survey paper on this topic. This paper give an overview to the topic of formal specification and verification of the separation kernel. We overview the concept of separation kernel and formal verification, survey the state of the art on the topic after the year 2000, and summarize these works by comparing them and discussing some issues.
Introduction
The concept of "Separation Kernel" was introduced by John Rushby in 1981 [1] . He proposed that secure systems should be conceived as distributed systems. Security should be achieved partly through physical separation, partly of components and partly through trusted functionality performed within some of these components. The separation kernel could decouple the verification of the trusted functions in the separated components from the verification of the security kernel. This work also originated the concept of Multiple Independent Levels of Security/Safety (MILS) [2] . MILS is a high-assurance security architecture based on the concepts of separation [1] and controlled information flow [3] . MILS provides the means to have several strongly separated partitions on the same physical computer/device, and enables existing of different security/safety level components in a system, each of which can be analyzed separately and is particularly well suited to embedded systems that must provide guaranteed safety or security properties. A MILS system employs the separation mechanism to maintain the assured data and process separation, and supports enforced security/safety policies by authorizing information flow between system components. The MILS architecture is layered, and consists of the separation kernel, the middleware and the applications. The MILS separation kernel is fundamental Figure 1 : The MILS architecture. Notation: Unclassified (U), confidential (C), secret (S), top secret (TS), single level (SL), multi level security (MLS) [4] to the MILS architecture and is basically a small piece of software that divides the system into separate partitions where the middleware and the applications are located, as shown in Fig. 1 . The separation kernel divides the computer into separate address spaces and scheduling intervals, i.e., gives time and space partitioning, and guarantees a strong isolation of the partitions except for the carefully controlled information flows between them. The middleware layer may provide an interface to the applications or provide a virtual machine enabling an operating system to be run within the partition. The strong separation between partitions both prevents information from leaking from one partition to another, and also provides fault-containment by preventing a fault in one partition from affecting another partition. MILS also enables communication channels (unidirectional or bidirectional) to be selectively configured between partitions.
The separation kernel concept came first into use in embedded systems that are relatively small and safety and reliability was vital, and has been accepted in the avionics community and is a requirement of ARINC 653 [5] compliant systems. It is for safety critical applications in embedded real time systems that these types of products exist today, for example VxWorks MILS [6] , INTEGRITY-178B [7] , LynxSecure [8] , LynxOS-178 [9] , PikeOS [10] , and open source software, for example POK [11] and Xtratum [12] .
In safety/security critical domain (e.g., avionics), the separation kernel is fundamental and a small piece of software underlying to run all applications. The correctness of separation kernel is pivotal for the whole system. Formal verification is an essential approach to prove or disprove the correctness of the system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. In [13] , 62 industrial projects using formal methods over 20 years are discussed, and it explains the effect of formal methods on time, cost and quality of systems. We could see the increasing evidence of the successful use of formal methods for software development, not only as an academic pursuit, but also the industrial applications. There are well established but different traditions within security and safety even if there are a lot of similarities.
(1) Verified security is achieved by Common Criteria (CC) [14] evaluation, with EAL 7 as the highest assurance level. For satisfying the EAL 7 certification requirements, the functionality of the separation kernel must be certified to have been rigourously verified using for-mal methods. EAL 7 requires formal methods in requirements, functional specification and high-level design. The low level design may be treated semi-formally and correspondence between implementation and low-level design is usually affirmed in an informal way. To reach a piece of software being fully formally verified, the verification chain should reach at least down to the level of implementation. In 2007, the Information Assurance Directorate of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) published the Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [15] within the framework established by the CC [14] . SKPP is a security requirements specification for separation kernels. SKPP mandates that formal methods be used to demonstrate the correspondence between security policy models and the functional specifications in the separation kernel. (2) Safety of software used in airborne systems is governed by RTCA DO-178B [16] requirements with level A as the highest level. The new version DO-178C [17] was published in 2011 to replace DO-178B and technology supplements also recommended the formal methods to complement testing.
Even the strongest levels of security evaluation schemes such as Common Criteria do not demand implementation level proofs, which have been widely thought infeasible. Although most of commercial products of separation kernel have been certified by DO-178B Level A and Common Criteria, we only found two Common Criteria EAL 7 certified separation kernel, LynxSecure and the AAMP7G Microprocessor [18] (a separation kernel in hardware), which are also not verified in implementation level. Without fully verification, the correctness of the separation kernels could not be fully assured.
As we know, many efforts have been paid on achieving the verified separation kernel in this decade. The notable works are formal verification of SYSGO PikeOS [19, 20, 21, 22] , INTEGRITY-178B kernel [23] , ED (Embedded Devices) separation kernel of Naval Research Laboratory [24, 25] , Honeywell DEOS [26, 27, 28] , etc. "Crash-Proof Code" that uses logic reduction to implement formal verification to create high dependable and safety-critical software, was one of 10 breakthrough technologies in 2011 selected by MIT Technology Review [29] . They reported the L4.verified project in NICTA (National ICT Australia). In the project, a thirdgeneration microkernel, seL4 (secure embedded L4) which comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler code, was fully formally verified using the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [30, 31] . They found 160 bugs in the C code in total, 16 of which were found during testing and 144 bugs during the C verification phase. This work provides referential experience for formal verification of the separation kernel and proves the feasibility of fully formal verification of a small kernel. We could find a survey on verification of the micro kernel of operating systems [32] , but up to date survey of separation kernel verification for safety and security critical systems does not exist in the literature.
Considering that the correctness of separation kernel is crucial for safety and security critical systems, this paper will survey the research works on formal specification and verification of this type kernel after the year 2000. We will outline these works in high-level including formal specification, models, and verification approaches. By detailedly comparing these works and discussion, this overview aims at proving a useful reference for separation kernel verification projects.
In the next section, we firstly introduce the "Separation kernel", and compare the separation kernel with other types of kernels to clarity the concepts. The idea of formal verification is also presented. In Section 3, the related works on formal specification and verification of separation kernels are surveyed by being grouped according to important properties, spatial separation and 3 temporal separation. In Section 4, we summarize the related works on this topic by comparing their target, objective, models, verified properties, used formal language, verification approach, development approach and used tools, and discuss some issues. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.
Technical Background
This section introduces the detailed information of the separation kernel and formal verification providing technical background for the following sections.
Separation Kernel 2.1.1. What's the Separation Kernel
A separation kernel is a type of security kernel [33] used to simulate a distributed environment. This concept was introduced by John Rushby in 1981 [1] . Rushby proposed the separation kernel as a solution to develop and verify the large and complex security kernels that were intended to "provide multilevel secure operation on general-purpose multi-user systems." "The task of a separation kernel is to create an environment which is indistinguishable from that provided by a physically distributed system: it must appear as if each regime is a separate, isolated machine and that information can only flow from one machine to another along known external communication lines. One of the properties we must prove of a separation kernel, therefore, is that there are no channels for information flow between regimes other than those explicitly provided. [1] " Based on the separation kernel, the system security is archived partially through physical separation of individual components and mediation of trusted functions performed within some components. It decouples the verification of components from the security kernel. The separation kernel provides to its hosted software applications high-assurance partitioning and information flow control properties that are both tamperproof and non-bypassable [34, 35] .
Untrusted software in one partition may contain malicious code that attacks other partitions or the separation kernel itself. The kernel of a commodity operating system usually cannot represent this kind of security policy and cannot provide adequate protection against this kind of attack.
In 2007, the Information Assurance Directorate of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) published the Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [15] , a security requirements specification for separation kernels. The SKPP describes, in Common Criteria [14] parlance, a class of modern products that provide the foundational properties of Rushby's conceptual separation kernel. The SKPP defines separation kernel as "hardware and/or firmware and/or software mechanisms whose primary function is to establish, isolate and separate multiple partitions and control information flow between the subjects and exported resources allocated to those partitions."
Unlike traditional operating systems services such as device driver, file sytems, network stack, etc., the separation kernel provides very specific functionality, enforcing data separation and information flow controls within a single microprocessor, and providing both time and space partitioning. The security policy that must be enforced in the separation kernel is relative simple. The security requirements for MILS includes four foundational security policies [34] : -Spatial Separation: each partition is implemented in a separated resource. Application in one partition cannot change the application or private data of another partition nor command the private devices or actuators of other partitions. This is also known as "Data Isolation". 4 -Temporal Separation: allows different components to share the same physical resource, but not at the same time. The resource is dedicated to one component for a period, then scrubbed clean and allocated to another component and so on. Service received from shared resources by the application in one partition cannot be affected by another partition. This is also known as "Periods Processing".
-Control of Information Flow: information flow from one partition to another is from an authenticated source to authenticated recipients; the source of information is authenticated to the recipient, and information goes only where intended.
-Fault Isolation: damage is limited by preventing a failure in one partition from cascading to any other partition.
The temporal separation requires that the memory address spaces, or objects, of a partition must be completely independent of other partitions. The information flow policy is a modification of spatial separation. Pure data isolation is not practical and the separation kernel defines authorized communication channels between partitions for inter-partition communication. Only through these mechanisms may pure data isolation be violated. The consequences of a fault or security breach in one partition are limited by the data isolation mechanisms. An faulty process in one partition can not affect processes in other partitions because addresses spaces of partitions are separate.
The separation kernel allows partitions to cause information flows, each of which when projected to partition space, comprises a flow between partitions. The allowed inter-partition information flows can be modeled as a "partition flow matrix" whose entries indicate the mode of the flow, read, write or some other modes. The "flow" rules are passed to the separation kernel in the form of configuration data that the kernel interprets during system initialization. For instance, a notional set of allowable information flows between partitions is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
NEAT are famous properties considered for the separation kernels, which is the abbreviation of Non-bypassable, Evaluatable, Always invoked and Tamper proof [34, 35] : -Non-bypassable: Security functions cannot be circumvented. This means a component can not use another communication path, including lower level mechanisms to bypass the security monitor.
-Evaluatable: Security functions are small and simple enough to enable rigorous proof of correctness through mathematical verification. This means the components are modular, well designed, well specified, well implemented, small, low complexity, etc.
-Always-invoked: Security functions are invoked each and every time. This means each and every access/message is checked by the appropriate security monitors (i.e., a security monitor will not just check on a first access and then pass all subsequent accesses/messages through).
-Tamperproof: the system controls "modify" rights to the security monitor code, configuration and data; preventing unauthorized changes, either by subversive or poorly written code.
These concepts, although intuitive, are not necessarily easy to formalise and prove directly. The separation kernel are usually verified by proving that it is able to provide the correct functionalities needed by MILS systems, spatial separation, temporal separation, information flow control and fault isolation. 5
The concern of the original separation kernel proposed by John Rushby [1] is security. Physical separation of individual components and controlled information flow among them by trusted kernel decompose the verification of components from verification of the kernel. The reason of the separation kernel concept coming first into use in embedded systems, especially in the avionic systems, is the acceptance of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) [36] in this community in 1990s. IMA is the integration of physically separated functions on common hardware platforms. The integration is furthermore supported by the trend of more powerful multicore computers. The IMA can decrease the weight and power consumption of currently implemented systems while concurrently creating new space, e.g. for new functional components such as on-board entertainment. Current embedded systems in airplanes are already built in an IMA fashion. A major foundation of the IMA concept for an operating system and the computing platform is the separation of computer system resources into isolated computation compartments -called partitions. Computations in partitions have to run concurrently in a way that any unintended interference and interaction between them is impossible. Thus, a partition is considered as a process with guaranteed processing performance (time partitioning, e.g. CPU time) and system resources (spatial partitioning, e.g. memory, devices). This is very similar with the separation kernel. Therefore, the concept of separation kernel was adopted in avionics as the kernel of the partitioning operating systems for IMA. The separation kernel in the community is also called "partitioning kernel" [35] . ARINC 653 specification [5] defines the standard interfaces of the partitioning kernel for IMA applications in different partitions. Besides the security, the partitioning kernel is also concerned about safety that means a failure in one partition must not propagate to cause failure in another partition.
Comparison of Different Kernels
There are similar kernel concepts with the separation kernel, that need to be clarified here. They are security kernel, partitioning kernel and hypervisor.
• Security Kernel [33] A separation kernel is a type of security kernel. The security kernel manages hardware resources, from which it creates, exports and protects abstractions (e.g., subjects/processes and memory objects) and related operations. It binds internal sensitivity labels to exported resources, and mediates access by subjects to other resources according to a partial ordering of the labels defined in an internal policy module. The separation kernel extends the security kernel by partitions. It maps the set of exported resources into partitions. Resources in a given partition are treated equivalently with respect to the inter-partition flow policy, and specifically, subjects in one partition can be allowed to access resources in another partition. Separation kernels enforce the separation of partitions, and allow (subjects in those) partitions to cause flows, each of which, when projected to partition space, comprises a flow between partitions [37] .
• Partitioning Kernel [38, 35, 39] The original separation kernel [1] is concerned about the security separation and controlling the information flows. Partitioning kernels is concerned about safety separation largely based on an ARINC 653-style separation scheme. Besides the information flow control, the partitioning kernel more concentrates on the spatial and temporal partitioning. Partitioning kernel provides a reliable protection mechanism for the integration of different application subsystems. It partitions a system into execution spaces that prohibit unintended interference of different application subsystems. Reliable protection in both the spatial and the temporal domain is particularly 6 relevant for systems where the co-existence of safety-critical and non safety-critical application subsystems shall be supported. Partitioning on node level enforces fault containment and thereby enables simplified replacement/update and increased reuse of software components. In order to provide an execution environment that allows the execution of software components without unintended interference, temporal and spatial partitioning for both computational and communication resources is required. Spatial partitioning ensures that one software component cannot alter the code or private data of another software component. Temporal partitioning ensures that a software component cannot affect the ability of other software components to access shared resources, such as the common network or a shared CPU. For spatial partitioning, system memory is divided among statically allocated partitions in a fixed manner. The idea is to take a processor and make it pretend it is several processors by completely isolating the subsystems. Hard partitions are set up for each part of the system, and each has certain amount of memory allocated to it. Each partition is forever limited to its initial fixed memory allocation, which can neither be increased nor decreased after the initial system configuration. For temporal partitioning, a partitioning kernel also runs in the static style. It typically supports a static table-driven scheduling approach [40] that is very well suited for safety-critical, hard real-time systems since its static nature makes it possible to check the feasibility of the schedule in advance. Furthermore, the maximum time between two partition activations is known in advance.
Typical partitioning kernel products are WindRiver VxWorks 653, GreenHill INTEGRITY-178B, LynxOS-178, PikeOS. All of them are ARINC-653 compliant. In the following sections, the word "Separation Kernel" covers the original concept [1] and the concept of partitioning kernel.
• Hypervisor [41] A hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM) provides a software virtualization environment in which other software, including operating systems, can run with the appearance of full access to the underlying system hardware, but in fact such access is under the complete control of the hypervisor. The paper [41] classified two types of hypervisor: Type 1 (or native, bare metal) hypervisor and Type 2 (or hosted) hypervisor. The hypervisor virtualizes the hardware (processor, memory, devices, etc.) for hosted operating systems. Therefore, general operating systems (Microsoft Windows, Linux, etc.) could run on top of hypervisor directly. Similar to a Type I hypervisor, a separation kernel achieves isolation of resources in different partitions by virtualization of shared resources, e.g. devices, memory, and the clock, such that each partition is assigned as a set of resources that appears to be entirely its own. But traditional hypervisors are specifically designed for secure separation, and typically do not provide services for explicit memory sharing and support interprocess communication only via emulated communication devices. The hypervisor permits the use of older, legacy applications (within a VM) and newer applications on the same platform. While the separation kernel typically only support specific APIs (for example, ARINC 653) for hosted applications. The hypervisor has been introduced into the embedded systems called embedded hypervisor to support VxWorks, Microsoft Windows, Linux applications in the same IMA systems. The applications of embedded hypervisors is growing. PikeOS, Wind River Hypervisor, LynuxWorks's LynxSecure are typical embedded hypervisors for safety/security critical systems.
Because of the overlapped functionality between the separation kernel and hypervisor, we will also survey some verification works of the hypervisor on separation in the following sections. 
Formal Verification
Formal verification is an essential approach to prove or disprove the correctness of the system with respect to a certain formal specification or property, using formal methods of mathematics. Concretely, assume that we have a model of a system and some properties/specification that the system is intended to fulfill. Formal verification of a system formally proves the conformance between the model and the specification. Software verification [42, 43] is to assure that software fully satisfies all the expected requirements. Fig. 2 depicts the main artefacts that are involved in software verification.
One approach and formation of the formal verification is model checking [44] . The model checking problem involves the construction of an abstract model M, in the form of variations on finite state automata, and the construction of specification formulas φ, in the form of variations on temporal logic [45] . The model checking verification problem involves establishing that the model semantically entails the specification:
The verification algorithm used in model checking involves exploring exhaustively the model to ensure that the formula φ holds. In order to guarantee termination, such an approach requires that the set of reachable states be finite. Some infinite models where infinite sets of states can be effectively represented finitely by using abstraction or taking advantage of symmetry. Implementation techniques include state space enumeration, symbolic state space enumeration, abstract interpretation, symbolic simulation, abstraction refinement. The properties to be verified are often described in temporal logics, such as linear temporal logic (LTL) or computational tree logic (CTL). The great advantage of model checking is that it is often fully automatic. But its primary disadvantage is that it does not in general scale to large systems. Symbolic models are typically limited to a few hundred bits of state, while explicit state enumeration requires the state space being explored to be relatively small.
Another approach is deductive verification or theorem proving. It proves that a system satisfies a specification by deductive reasoning. System model and specification are expressed as 8 formulas in a formal logic. Required relationship (logical equivalence/logical implication) is described as a theorem to be proven within the context of a proof calculus. A collection of mathematical proof obligations need to be generated from the system and its specifications to show the holding of the theorem. The truth of proof obligations imply correctness of the proving which means the conformance of the system to its specification. The proof obligations could be checked using theorem provers or SMT solvers. It is a purely syntactic matter to decide whether each theorem is an axiom or follows from previous theorems (axioms) by a rule of inference. The calculi used in theorem proving approaches to software verification was first introduced by C.A.R. Hoare. He describes a calculus to reason about program correctness in terms of pre and post conditions [46] . Hoare's approach to proving correctness introduced the concept of a "Hoare triple", which is a formula in the following form:
The formula means if precondition φ PRE holds before program P starts, φ POS T holds after the execution of P. In this calculus, axioms and rules of inference are used to derive φ POS T based on φ PRE and P. E. G. Dijkstra extended Hoare's ideas in the concept of "predicate transformers" which, instead of starting with a pre condition and post condition, starts with a post condition and uses the program code to determine the pre condition that needs to hold to establish the post condition [47] .
A key difference between this approach and the model checking approach is that theorem provers do not need to exhaustively visit the system's state space to verify properties. Consequently, a theorem prover can reason about infinite state spaces. This can be achieved because a theorem prover reasons about constraints on states, not instances of states. While theorem provers have distinct advantages over model checkers, deductive verification also have its drawbacks. The proof system of a theorem prover for a system of practical size can be extremely large. Furthermore, the generated proofs can be large and difficult to understand. It typically requires the user to understand in detail why the system works correctly, and to convey this information to the verification system. This leads to theorem provers requiring a great deal of user expertise and effort.
3. The state of the art As described in Subsection 2.2, software verification consists of specifying (produce the specification, properties), modeling (produce the model) and verification. In this section, we firstly survey the specification and formal model of the separation kernel. Then, we will survey research works on the formal verification of the separation kernel.
The formal models of separation kernel in the first Subsection are focused on the typical outcomes of the formal development of separation kernels. The models that are used as the input of formal verification mentioned in the second Subsection will not be discussed separately.
Specification and Models 3.1.1. Requirements
The Common Criteria [14] is an internationally recognized standard for security evaluation of IT products. The Common Criteria provides the "Protection Profiles" (PP) to allow consumer groups and communities to express their security needs. In CC, a Security Target (ST) always describes a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE) and a PP describes the general requirements for 9 Resource 7
Resource 8
Resource 9
Resource 10 Subject 2 Subject 3
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The TOE rules for isolation are referred to as the Partitioned Information Flow Policy (PIFP). The PIFP defines the authorizations for information flow between partitions and between subjects and exported resources. The mode or direction of the flow -such as send, receive, read (including execute-only, which could be further restricted by the ST author), write or read-write -indicates whether information flows from the subject to the exported resource (e.g., write) or from the resource to the subject (e.g., read), or both. Thus, an information flow is defined as a <partition/subject, partition/exported resource, mode> triplet. Note that the exported resource may be another subject. By default, the TOE allows no information flow between partitions or between subjects and exported resources. 
48
The configuration data may be comprised of:
• Definition of partitions, both in terms of the allocation of exported resources to partitions 29 Figure 3: Allocation of TOE Resources [15] a TOE type. The TOE may be a software application, an operating system, their combination and other IT products.
A protection profile for high assurance "partitioning kernels", Partitioning Kernel Protection Profile (PKPP) [35] , was developed by members of the Open Group Real-Time and Embedded Systems Forum from the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company and the Air Force Research Laboratory, as a possible standard for a Realtime Operating System (RTOS) security. Based on the PKPP, a Common Criteria protection profile for high-robustness separation kernels, Protection Profile for Separation Kernels (SKPP) [15] , was published by NSA in 2007 within the framework established by the Common Criteria [14] . "SKPP specifies the security functional and assurance requirements for a class of separation kernels. Unlike those traditional security kernels which perform all trusted functions for a secure operating system, a separation kernel's primary security function is to partition (viz. separate) the subjects and resources of a system into security policy-equivalence classes, and to enforce the rules for authorized information flows between and within partitions. [15] " It mainly addresses security evaluations at EAL 6 and EAL 7 of Common Criteria.
A subset of the exported resources are active and are commonly referred to as subjects. Flows occur between a subject and a resource, and between the subject's partition and the resource's partition, in a direction defined by a mode. In read mode, the subject is the destination of the flow and in write mode the subject is the source of the flow. The SKPP enforces a compound security policy, or Partitioned Information Flow Policy (PIFP), with requirements at the gross partition level as well as at the granularity of individual subjects and resources. The exported resources, partitions, and allowed flows are specified in a configuration-vector input to the separation kernel during its initialization. Fig. 3 illustates an example allocation of TOE resources. The resources inside of each rectangle are bound to that partition. Allowed information flow is indicated by the directed arrows. Inter-partition flows are also shown, for example, Subject 2 is allowed to write Resource 6, and Subject 3 is allowed to read Resource 9. With this policy abstraction, subject(s) in a partition can have different access rights to resources in the same or different partitions. Resources 7, 8 and 10 are included to illustrate this finer grained control of information flow.
SKPP enforces a partition-to-partition policy (P2P p ) and a subject-to-resource (S 2R p ) policy (also known as a least privilege policy), associated with each policy are the rules regarding flows, P2P and S2R respectively, which are sets of flows [48] : The PIFP policy of SKPP is:
where sys.policy indicates which policies are configured to be active. In the S 2R p policy the S 2R rules override the P2P rules everywhere except where there is a null entry in the S 2R rule set. Note that the S 2R p policy is defined to reference the P2P values, regardlessof whether the P2P p policy itself is active.
The separation kernels of VxWorks MILS, LynxSecure, INTEGRITY-178B, and PikeOS meet the security functional and security assurance requirements in SKPP.
In contrast to SKPP for high robustness, a Medium-Robustness Separation Kernel Protection Profile [49] aims to propose a set of requirements for medium-robustness separation kernels considering that not every environment requires such a high degree of robustness, since physical access constraints may guarantee a level of trustworthiness of individuals having access to the system. They dispensed or weakened the security functional requirements in SKPP for reduced assurance level. U.S. National Security Agency also published a guidance [50] for the application of both high-and medium-robustness separation kernels and some other protection profiles for medium-robustness [51] .
Separation kernels can be seen as a subclass of security kernels [33] . The basic idea of security kernel is to implement security-critical functionality, i.e., mediating the access to resources according to a security policy. A Common Criteria protection profile for high assurance security kernels (HASK-PP) [52, 53] has been evaluated and certified at EAL 5 level by the German Federal Ofice for Information Security (BSI). HASK-PP covers trusted computing features such as trusted boot, sealing, and trusted channels without depending on any concrete implementation for these features. HASK-PP covers a wider range of security functionality than SKPP, and in particular includes trusted computing functionality.
Formal Specification and Models
The formal model of separation kernel presents a significant contribution to the verification. Here, we only discuss the models for formally developing the separation kernels. Models targeted to formal verification will be surveyed in the next Subsection. In formal development, the specification may be used as a guide while the concrete implementation is developed during the design process, once the formal specification of the software has been produced.
Firstly, we discuss some works on specifying key properties of the separation kernel.
• MASK
The Department of Defense set out in 1997 to formally construct a separation kernel, a Mathematically Analyzed Separation Kernel (MASK) [54, 55] , which has been used by Motorola on its smartcard. MASK regulates communication between processes based on a separation policy. The separation property of MASK includes two separation axioms: the communication policy and an unamed policy. In the abstraction of MASK separation kernel, Multiple Cell Abstraction (MCA) describes the system. The Init and Next operations evolve the system. A Cell or Single Cell Abstraction (SCA) is a domain of execution, or a context, and a collection of strands. Each strand is a stream of instructions to be executed when a message is input to a strand of a cell. The communication policy is
where Fiber y determines the SCA corresponding to the CellID y in the subscript, Next x advances the system state by advancing the cell indicated by the subscript y. The policy states that if the fiber of cell y changes as the result of advancing the state of cell x, it must be the case that x is permitted to communicate with y. The second separation constraint upon cells is
The policy represents that if an action by cell x is going to change the state of cell y, then the change in the state of y depends only on the states of x and y. In other words, the new state of y is a function of the previous states of x and y.
• GWV Policy A formal specification of what the system allows and guards against is called a formal security policy. The GWV security policy proposed by Greve, Wilding and Vanfleet [56] models a separation kernel, which enforces partitioning between applications running on a single processor system. The separation axiom of the security policy is
where segs = dia(seg) ∩ segso f partition(current(st1)). The security policy requires that the effect on an arbitrary memory segment seg of the execution of one machine step is a function ofthe set of memory segments that are both allowed to interact with seg and are associated with the current partition. In this formula, the function select extracts the values in a machine state that are associated with a memory segment. The function selectlist takes a list of segments and returns a list of segment values in a machine state. The function current calculates the current partition given a machine state. The function next models one step of computation of the machine state and takes as an argument a machine state and returns a machine state that represents the effect of the single step. The function dia takes as an argument a memory segment name and returns a list of memory segments that are allowed to effect it. The function segso f partition returns names of the memory segments associated with a particular partition. The detailed information about the meaning of a machine state and the next function of states are explained in [57] The separation security policies, infiltration, mediation and exfiltration [58] can also be presented by the GWV separation axiom [56] . Exfiltration specifies that the private data of executing partition cannot be written to, modify or otherwise influence the private data of another partition. Mediation specifies that an executing partition cannot use private data from one partition to modify or otherwise influence private data of another partition. Infiltration specifies that an executing partition cannot read or otherwise influenced by private data of another partition. GWV policy implies the basic separation axioms of MASK [54, 55] .
The GWV security policy has been well known and accepted in industry [59, 60, 61] . The GWV policy also satisfies the non-interference property [62] that a separation kernel forbids covert channels to ensure that no illicit information flow can take place. The policy says that for any given segment, the values of the segment are only affected by memory segments that are allowed to communicate with it and that are part of the currently executing partition. The PVS formalization of GWV policy was also been provided by Rushby [63] , the proposer of Separation Kernel.
The GWV policy was changed/extended in [57, 64] . The original GWV model ignores that these segments belong to a partition and is too powerful for commercial microprocessors and operating systems. The dia function was weakened by allowing communication between segments of the same partition in [57] as following:
The dia function was also extended by adding a restriction considering partition names, diaS trong(seg, p) ⊂ dia(seg), in [64] . In [64] , the GWV policy was also extended by adding the sub ject. A subject is an active entity which operates on segments of a GWV-partition. The extended GWV policy is
where segs = diastrong(seg, current(st1)) ∩ segso f partition(current(st1)). The extended GWV policy has been applied on PikeOS [64] which has layered structure including a microkernel and a separation kernel (Virtualisation Layer). The partition-to-partition policy and subjectto-resource policy in SKPP discussed in Subsection 3.1.1 are application level policies. They 13 could be configured for an application and loaded when the application initializing. The extended GWV policy here is a security property that could be used to find information leak in the application level policies. GWV only applicable to a class of systems in which strict temporal partitioning is utilized and kernel state cannot be influenced by execution of code within partitions. The GWV theorem has also been shown to hold for the AAMP7G's hardware-based separation kernel [18] . The AAMP7G's kernel is very static. The original GWV theorem is only applicable to such strict static schedulers. The GWV policy is sound but not complete [65] . In GWV, dia (direct interaction allowed) function only expresses the direct interaction between segments. It was extended with multiple active "Agent" in GWVr1 [65] that moving data from one segment to another segment is under control of one agent. GWVr1 is similar to the diaS trong function in [64] . For more dynamic models, a more general GWV theorem, GWVr2 [65] , uses a more generalized influence between segments, the information flow graph, to specify the formal security policy. The information flow graph enables system analysis and can also be used as foundation for application level policies. The GWVr2 was used to formal analysis for the INTEGRITY-178B kernel [23] . More theoretical discussion of GWVr1 and GWVr2 is in [61] .
• ED Data Separation
To provide evidence for a Common Criteria evaluation of the ED (Embedded Devices) separation kernel to enforce data separation, five subproperties, namely, No-Exfiltration, No-Infiltration, Temporal Separation, Separation of Control, and Kernel Integrity are proposed to verify the kernel [24, 25] . The Top Level Specification (TLS) is used to provide a precise and understandable description of the allowed security-relevant external behavior of ED's separation kernel and to make the assumptions on which the TLS is based explicit. TLS is also to provide a formal context and precise vocabulary for defining data separation. In TLS, the state machine representing the kernel behavior is defined in terms of an input alphabet, a set of states, an initial state, and a transform relation describing the allowed state transitions. The input alphabet contains internal events (cause the kernel to invoke some process) and external events (performed by an external host). The state consists of the id of a partition processing data, the values of the partition's memory area, and a flag to indicate sanitization of each memory area.
The No-Exfiltration Property states that data processing in any partition cannot influence data stored outside the partition, which is formulated as:
where s, s are states and s is the next state of s transited by an event e in partition j. P j is the internal event set of partition j. E In j is the set of external events writing into or clearing the input buffers of partition j. E Out j is the set of external events reading from or clearing the output buffers of partition j. For any memory area a of the system (M), a is a memory area in partition j (A j ), if the value of a in state s and s are not equal.
The No-Infiltration Property states that data processing in an partition is not influenced by data outside that partition, which is formulated as:
Temporal Separation Property guarantees that the data areas in any partition are clear when the system is not processing data in that partition, which is formulated as:
where c s is the id of a partition processing data in state. c s is 0 means that no data processing in any partition is in progress. D Satisfying this property implies that no data stored in the partition during one configuration of this partition can remain in any memory area of a later configuration of that same partition.
The Separation of Control Property states that when data processing is in progress on a partition, no data is being processed on another partition until processing on the first partition terminates, which is formulated as:
where c s is the id of partition processing data in state s.
The Kernel Integrity Property states that when data processing is in progress on a partition, the data stored on the shared memory area does not change, which is formulated as:
where G is the single shared memory area and contains all programs and data not residing in any memory area of partitions, P i is the internal event set of partition i. The GWV policy and its extensions concern with the data dependency in different partitions. While the upper five data separation properties consider the dependency of data in different partitions indirectly. It bases on a shared memory by which partitions influence with each other by external event (writing/reading data to/from the input/output buffer of each partition). The five data separation properties can also be presented by the GWV policy, except the Temporal Separation Property. The No-Exfiltration Property is a special case of exfiltration theorem in [56] without the dia function. The No-Infiltration Property is a equivalent to the infiltration theorem in [56] on different abstract model. The Separation of Control Property also means that one step execution in a partition could not effect data on another partition. Its external event may effect the shared memory, but not memory area in other partitions. This is also a special case of exfiltration theorem in [56] in the situation that partitions exchange data indirectly by the shared memory. For the Kernel Integrity Property, we could consider that the shared memory is the data area of a special partition, then one step internal execution of other partitions could not effect this shared memory. This is a special case of the exfiltration theorem in [56] . In GWV, separation does no include Temporal Separation Property, since the model does not allow reconfigurable partitions [24, 25] .
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Following the earlier book on the modelling of operating system kernels [66] that shows it is possible and relatively easy to specify small kernels and refine them to running code, Craig [67] concerned entirely with the specification, design and refinement in Z [68] to executable code of operating system kernels, one of which is a separation kernel, to demonstrate that the refinement of formal specifications of kernels is possible and quite tractable. The separation kernel in this book is a microkernel for cryptographic and other secure applications.
Craig provides a substantial work on a formal separation kernel model which delivers the majority of separation kernel requirements and functionality [69] : (1) Process table for basic process management; (2) Process spatial separation in terms of non-overlapping address space allocation; (3) Communication channels by the means of an asynchronous kernel-based messaging system; (4) Process temporal separation using a non-preemptive scheduler and the messaging system; (5) Kernel protection by employing external process identifiers and clear interfaces for processes. Also, a secure kernel exit is defined in case of invalid interface access; (6) Exported kernel resources as device processes; (7) Separation and principle of least privilege for device processes by providing special interfaces within the kernel and otherwise treating them as other processes; (8) Synchronous user process -device interaction by supporting priority execution for devices; (9) Basic verification of several kernel properties using mathematical proofs.
The separation kernel specification is relatively complete and the refinements reach the level at which executable code in a language such as C or Ada can be read off from the Z specification. The separation kernel frequently needs threads/task inside each partition. In the Craig's model, it make no mention of threads. They said that threads can be included by simple modifications to the specification. Hardware is not the emphasis in their work. They did not want to specify any particular piece of hardware for the kernel and in the case of the separation kernel, they specified the Intel IA32/64 hardware operations at a level of detail that they felt adequate for the production of the tiny amounts of assembly code required to complete the kernel. Finally, they did all of the work in their book by hand including the specification and proofs.
• Z model of separation kernel in Verified Software project Formal modelling of separation kernel [70, 69] is part of a pilot project in modelling OS kernels within an international Grand Challenge (GC) in Verified Software [71, 13] . The objective of this work is to provide proofs of the correctness of a formal specification and design of a separation kernel. They started from Craig's formal models of separation kernel [67] , and toke into account separation kernel requirements set out by Rushby [1] and in SKPP [15] . The Craig's original models are typeset by hand and include several manual proofs. Mechanisation of the separation kernel requires Craig's all hand-written Z models to be recreated in a Z tool. The specification is augmented in [70, 69] using Z notation [72] by mechanising it with the Z/Eves theorem prover. All proofs in [67] were also declared and proved using the Z/Eves prover. As a result, syntax errors Craig's specification were eliminated, model feasibility and API robustness were verified, and missing invariants and new security properties to guarantee correct operations were found. The upgraded formal model was fully proved mechanically.
The full separation of processes is not achieved and verified in [70, 69] . The upgraded formal model focuses on the core data structures within a separation kernel, the process table, queue and scheduler. Craig's scheduler model was significantly improved. Certain properties about the scheduler (e.g., the scheduler deadlock analysis) are able to be formulated and proved by translating verbal requirements to mathematical invariants and improving design of the specification.
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Other components of a separation kernel, such as messaging or memory management, are not mechanised.
• B model of a secure partitioning kernel
The B Method [73] has been used for the (partial) formal development of a secure partitioning kernel (SPK) in the Critical Software company [74] . The novelty of this work in the formal methods community is an extra challenge to apply the B Method outside its usual application domain (railway and automotive).
In this work, a complete development of a high-level model of the SPK was built initially. The high-level models constitute a complete architectural design of the system, and was animated and validated by the ProB [75] . Abstract model of SPK in high-level consists of memory management, scheduling, kernel communication, flow policy, and clock. The validated high-level models can be refined for a completely formally developed SPK, but as a first step to this task, the Partition Information Flow Policy (PIFP), which is part of the SPK, was refined to a level where C code can be automatically generated from it. The PIFP defines the rules for each flow between partitions that has to be monitored and controlled by the kernel. The refinement process that led to the implementation of the PIFP was carried out with the assistance of Atelier B.
Finally, an open source micro kernel, PREX, was adopted to integrate the proposed PIFP. They demonstrated the feasibility of applying formal methods only to parts of the system.
• B model of the OS-K separation kernel A separation-kernel-based operating system has been designed for use in secure embedded systems by applying formal methods to the design of the separation-kernel (OS-K) [76] . The separation-kernel layer and the additional OS services on top of it were prototyped on the Intel IA-32 architecture. The separation kernel was designed using two formal methods: the B method and the Spin model checker. The B method was adopted as formal design, and Spin for verification via model checking.
The separation kernel is a small OS kernel that provides an abstract distributed environment to partitions on a single processor. It was designed using two formal methods: the B method and the Spin model checker. The separation-kernel layer provides several functions: partition management, inter-partition communication, access control for inter-partition communication, memory management, timer management, processor scheduling, I/O interrupt synchronization for device driver operation, interrupt-handling. The separation kernel provides the access-control function for inter-partition communication, which provides the only linkage between otherwise separate partitions. In the IA-32-architecture-based implementation of the separation kernel, two memory-protection features of the IA-32 architecture are utilized: the ring protection feature of the IA-32 architecture is used to protect the memory area of the separation kernel against access by the processes and the partition OSs; each partition is assigned a local descriptor table in which the partition segments are registered to isolate the partition memory spaces.
The specifications of the separation kernel in the proposed architecture were described in classical B method. The main components in the description and their relationships are outlined in Fig. 4 .
Abstract machines are described as MODELs. The skinterface MODEL is the interface of the OS-K separation kernel to upper layers and describes the main functions of message passing, scheduler, the timer, I/O synchronization, and the interrupt handler. The kernel part that runs in de and controls the whole system needs urance level. hods were considered for designing the ding Z language [9] , the B method [10] , el checker [14] , [15] . The B method is because the abstract description of the refined to a more concrete description, of the IMPLEMENTATION in B correctness of the refinement can be ssociated with the B method. Therefore, ted for designing the overall structure of f the separation kernel in the proposed bed in B. The main components in the elationships are outlined in Fig. 3 An example MODEL description, that of memalc operation in the memorymanager MODEL, is shown in Fig. 4 . 
B. Verification of Abstract Machines
The correctness, i.e., consistency, of the descriptions was verified using B4free [12] . B4free is a tool for the B method that supports the generation of proof obligations and their proofs. It verifies the proof obligations automatically as much as possible; any that it cannot verify are left for verification by hand. In automatic verification, the tool verifies whether the invariant conditions described in the INVARIANT clause of the operation description hold after the operation has been executed as well as at initialization. It has an interactive verification mode that supports verification by hand. [76] Other MODELs were also refined to the IMPLEMENTATION description by converting the non-deterministic sections to sequential processing. Proof obligations of their B model were generated and verified in B4free tools. There were more than 2,700 proof obligations and almost all of them were proved automatically in B4free tools.
Verification
As introduced in Section 2, the typical functionalities of the separation kernel are spatial separation, temporal separation, information flow control and fault isolation. The information flow policy is a modification of spatial separation and fault isolation can be achieved by separation of address spaces and time of partitions. Therefore, most verification works on the separation kernel consider spatial and temporal separation. In this Subsection, we will survey the verification works concerning these two aspects respectively.
Spatial Separation
Spatial separation must ensure that software in one partition cannot change the software or private data of another partition (either in memory or in transit) nor command the private devices or actuators of other partitions [38] . The concerns of spatial separation from bottom to top are memory (address space) separation of partitions helped by a memory management unit (MMU) and data separation of applications. Memory separation ensures that partitions have their own non-intersect address spaces. Data separation ensures that data or memory segments or state variables in one partition are independent with data/segments/variables in other partitions except information flow exists among them.
• ED Separation Kenrel Heitmeyer et al provided a novel and practical approach to verify the security of the separation kernel code which substantially reduces the cost of verification [24, 25] . The objectiveof this project is to provide evidence for a Common Criteria evaluation of the ED (Embedded Devices) separation kernel to enforce data separation. The ED separation kernel contains on the order of 3,000 lines of C and assembly code. The code was annotated with preconditions and postconditions in the style of Hoare and Floyd in advance. A security property of interest is also given. The code verification process consists of five steps. (1) Producing a Top-Level Specification (TLS) of the separation-relevant behavior of the kernel. The TLS of the kernel behavior is represented in precise natural language as a state machine model. In TLS, the state machine representing the kernel behavior is defined in terms of an input alphabet, a set of states, an initial state, and a transform relation describing the allowed state transitions. The input alphabet contains internal events (cause the kernel to invoke some process) and external events (performed by an external host). The state consists of the ID of a partition processing data, the values of the partition's memory area, and a flag to indicate sanitization of each memory area. (2) Formally expressing the security property as a property of the state machine model. The data separation proved in this paper consists of five subproperties, namely, No-Exfiltration, No-Infiltration, Temporal Separation, Separation of Control, and Kernel Integrity. All these five properties are preserved under refinement. (3) Formally verifying that the TLS enforces data separation. The natural language formulation of the TLS and the properties were translated into TAME (Timed Automata Modeling Environment), a front end to the mechanical prover PVS. They interactively constructed (TAME) proofs showing that the TAME specification satisfies each property. (4) Partitioning the code into three categories, Event, Other, and Trusted Code, based on some criterion determined by the property of interest. The Other Code is kernel code which does not correspond to any behavior defined by the TLS and can be ignored while be verifying. The cost of code verification was dramatically reduced since only the Other Code comprises more than 90 percent of the kernel code. (5) Demonstrating that the kernel code conforms to the TLS. They defined two mapping functions to establish correspondence between the TLS and kernel code. A mapping establishes correspondence between concrete states in the code and abstract states in the TLS. Another one maps the preconditions and postconditions of the TLS events to the preconditions and postconditions that annotate the corresponding Event Code. Based on these results, they concluded that the code refines the TLS. They adopted the natural language representation of the TLS and the size of the TLS is very small (only 15 pages long). It can simplify communication with the other stakeholders, changing the specification when the kernel behavior changed, translating the specification into TAME, and proving that the TLS enforced data separation. They used 2.5 weeks to formulate the TLS and the data separation property, 3.5 weeks to produce the TAME model and formally verify that the TLS enforces data separation, and 5 weeks to establish conformance between code and TLS. The cost of formal verification is much lower than the verification effort on seL4 kernel [30, 31] where they translated almost all of source code to the Isabelle/HOL description.
• AAMP7G microprocessor The AAMP7G and its previous version AAMP7 microprocessor of Rockwell Collins are hardware implementation of the separation kernel. They are designed for use in MILS architecture systems. It has been certified by the National Security Agency as a MILS device. The AAMP7G supports simultaneous processing at all security levels -from unclassified through top secret. The AAMP7 and AAMP7G design was proven mathematically to achieve MILS using formal methods techniques as specified by EAL 7 of the Common Criteria [60, 18] .
The AAMP7G provides a novel architectural feature, intrinsic partitioning, that enables the microprocessor to enforce an explicit communication policy between applications. This mecha-19 nism simplifies the construction of systems composed of several applications that operate on the microprocessor concurrently. Applications that reside on the AAMP7G can be developed and verified without regard to the behavior of applications that reside in other partitions.
Rockwell Collins has performed a formal verification of the AAMP7G partitioning system using the ACL2 theorem prover. They first established a formal security specification, AAMP7G GWV theorem, which is the intrinsic partitioning separation theorem [60] . This theorem is an instantiation of GWV policy [56] . Then, they produced an abstract model of the AAMP7G's partitioning system and a low-level model that directly corresponded to the AAMP7G microcode. In the low-level model, each line of microcode was modeled by how it updates the state of the partition-relevant machine. The entire AAMP7G model is approximately 3,000 lines of ACL2 definitions. The AAMP7G GWV theorem was proved using ACL2. The proof was decomposed into three main pieces: proofs validating the correctness theorem, proof that the abstract model meets the security specification, and proof that the low-level model corresponds with the abstract model.
The AAMP7G GWV theorem is as following. The theorem involves abstract and functional (low-level) models of the AAMP7G. The theorem is about the behavior of the functional model, but they express the theorem about an abstract model of the AAMP7G that has been "lifted" from a functional model. In this way, the expression of the theorem is simplified. Moreover, the behavior of the most concrete model of the AAMP7G is also presented to ensure that the theorem is about the "real" AAMP7G.
secure con f ig(spex) ∧ spex hyp(spex, f un st1) ∧ spex hyp(spex, f un st2) ⇒ ( raw selectlist(segs, abs st1) = raw selectlist(segs, abs st2) ∧ current(abs st1) = current(abs st2) ∧ raw select(seg, abs st1) = raw select(seg, abs st2) ⇒ raw select(seg, li f t raw(spex, next(spex, f un st1))) = raw select(seg, li f t raw(spex, next(spex, f un st2))) ) (13) where abs st1 = li f t raw(spex, f un st1), abs st2 = li f t raw(spex, f un st2) and segs = dia f s(seg, abs st1) ∩ segs f s(current(abs st1), abs st1).
• PikeOS PikeOS [77] is a powerful and efficient paravirtualization real-time operating system based on a separation microkernel. The PikeOS partitioning system, in conjunction with its internal protection mechanisms, provides the highest available level of safety and security. The Verisoft XT 1 project has an Avionics subproject [19, 20, 78] that is to prove functional correctness of all 1 http://www.verisoftxt.de/StartPage.html 20 system calls of the PikeOS (i.e., the functionality that the kernel provides to guest systems) at the source code level using the VCC verification tool 2 . They propose a simulation theorem between a top-level abstract model and the system consisting of the kernel and user programs running in alternation on the real machine. They identify the correctness properties of all components in the trace that are needed for the overall correctness proof of the microkernel.
The separation kernel of PikeOS was also be proved considering the memory separation [22] . Architecturally PikeOS consists of two major components: a micro-kernel and a paravirtualisation layer. The para-virtualisation layer is implemented on the top of the micro-kernel and provides separated execution partitions for user applications. The para-virtualisation layer is a separation kernel. Because a mixed-criticality system built on PikeOS relies on the correct implementation of the separation mechanisms, their verification efforts also consider the separation for memory. They formally verified the memory manager which is one of the crucial components of PikeOS separation kernel. The verification was carried out on the level of the source code using the VCC tool.
PikeOS supports virtualization of memory such that user applications run in their own virtual memory. In addition the kernel memory manager assigns to partitions pieces of memory which are organized in pages. After boot-time initialization, the partitions have been statically assigned memory pages. At run-time these pages dynamically store data structures used by the partitions. They consider strict separation of kernel memory partitions at run-time and prove that the memory manager does not violate the predefined partitioning of memory, i.e. the run-time reallocations of pages between data structures within a partition do not cause any violation of the statical allotment of memory between partitions. Unlike GWV security policy for the separation kernel which appears to be too fine-grained, they followed a more straight-forward approach in formulating the separation property, which states that "all memory accesses in the kernel preserve an initial disjoint partitioning of memory, and obey a security policy where a thread is only allowed to access memory from its assigned partition".
The desired separation property is easy to describe informally but infeasible to define directly in the specification language supported by code annotation tools like VCC or Frama-C 3 . Therefore, they broke down the high-level, non-functional requirement into functional memory manager properties, which can be proven by VCC tool. Their three memory manager properties are (1) the memory manager has the desired functionality, (2) a thread may only allocate or free memory belonging to its partition, and (3) a call to the memory manager does not alter the partitioning of memory locations. Other seven assumptions were also introduced. They proved that correctness of the three properties and seven assumptions implies their separation property. To the end they proved that the memory manager does not violate the predefined partitioning of memory, which means that there is no unintended information flow between partitions, due to a misfunction of a partition's memory manager.
The GWV security policy has also been applied to verify the PikeOS separation kernel in SYSGO AG [64] . They extended the GVW policy with subjects to resolve the problem that the same current partition can have different active tasks. They also showed a modular way to apply the GWV policy for the two layers of PikeOS. In PikeOS, the separation kernel is built on top of a micro-kernel. The separation functionality of separation kernel is based on the resource separation provided by the micro-kernel. Thus, security policies have to exist on both the microand the separation kernel levels. They applied the GWV policy on both components and formally show that the policy on the micro-kernel level implies the policy on the level of the separation kernel. The modular and reusable application of the security policy reduces the number of formal models, and hence, the number of artifacts to certify.
The subject extended GWV policy is showed in Formula 7. In the micro-kernel model, the major abstractions are tasks and threads, which are corresponding to subjects and partitions in the extended GWV theorem respectively. The segment is instantized as the physical address in the memory. In the separation kernel model, they added the "partition", and separated the tasks of micro-kernel model and physical address of the memory into different partitions. In the GWV policy of separation kernel, the task is hidden and the owner-member relationships between partition and task, task and thread are reserved. Partitions and threads in the separation kernel layer are abstracted as partition and subject of the extended GWV policy. All models are formalised in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
• INTEGRITY-178B
The INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel of Green Hills Software was formally analysed and obtained a Common Criteria Certificate at the EAL 6+ level on September 1, 2008 [23] . The INTEGRITY-178B evaluation requirements for EAL 6+ specify five elements that are either formal or semiformal: (1) The Security Policy Model which is a formal specification of the relevant security properties of the system. Considering that the original GWV theorem [56] is only applicable to strict static kernels, they adopted the GWVr2 [61] theorem as the Common Criteria Security Policy Model for INTGERITY-178B because INTEGRITY-178B's scheduling model is much more dynamic. The GWVr2 theorem is system(state) = system * (graph, state). This theorem means that the system and system * produce identical results for all inputs of interest. It implies that the graph used by system * completely captures the information flow of the system. The system is modeled as a state transition system that receives as inputs the current state of the system, as well as any external inputs, and produces a new system state, as well as any external outputs. This state transition is expressed as state = system(state), where the external inputs and outputs are also contained in the system state structure. The system can be represented by S (the number of state elements plus the number of output elements) copies of the original system, each producing one element of the next state or output. Each of these S systems can be fed with only the elements of the current state and inputs that are necessary for it to compute its result. A system that takes a current state and input elements, maps the appropriate inputs to S copies of the system, and then maps the S resulting elements into the next state and external outputs is denoted as system * . The system * maps the graph that specifies how the current state and inputs elements are mapped to the S subsystems and current state to the next system state, expressed as state = system * (graph, state). The low-level design specification was modelled in ACL2 which has one-to-one correspondence with the implementation C source code. This simplified the "code-to-spec" review during Common Criteria Certification. In order to prove the GWVr2 theorem on the ACL2 model, they firstly prove two lemmas with respect to each function in this model. The Workhorse Lemma states that the function's graph sufficiently captures the dependencies in the data flows of the 22 function. The ClearP Lemma states that all of the changes to state performed by a function are captured by the function's graph. Once these two lemmas are proven, it is straightforward to prove GWVr2 for the function.
• PROSPER separation kernel
The information flow security for a simple ARM-based separation kernel, PROSPER, has been formally verified by proving the bisimulation between the abstraction specification and the kernel binary code, where communication between partitions is explicit and information flow is analyzed in presence of such communication channels [79] .
The PROSPER kernel consists of 150 lines of assembly code and 600 lines of C code. Their system model only considers two partitions that are respectively executed on two separate special ARMv7 machines communicating via asynchronous message passing, a logical component and a shared timer. The goal of verification is to show that there is no way for the partitions to affect each other, directly or indirectly, except through the communication channel. It is assured by that a partition can not access the memory or register contents, by reading or writing, of the other partition, except that the communication is realized by explicit usage of the intended channel. Therefore, the isolation theorem of their kernel is
where g ∈ 1, 2 indicates the partition, mem 1 , mem 2 are initial memories of the two partitions respectively. r (real system) indicates the implementation and i (ideal system) the abstraction model. The theorem means that the traces of each partition in abstraction and implementation layers are equivalent.
The theorem to be proved was reduced to subsidiary properties: isolation lemmas of ARM and User/Handler. Their three ARM lemmas concerning the ARM instruction set architecture assures that (1) behavior of the active partition is influenced only by those resources allowed to do so if an ARM machine executes in user mode in a memory protected configuration, (2) the non-accessible resources not allocated to the active partition in user mode are not modified by the execution of this partition, (3) if an ARM machine switches from a state in user mode to another state in privileged mode then the conditions for the execution of the handler are prepared properly. Their models were built on top of the Cambridge ARM HOL4 model, extended with a simple MMU unit. The isolation lemmas of ARM were proved using ARM-prover, developed for the purpose in HOL4.
Given the ARM Lemmas, they proved User/Handler lemmas for the real and the ideal systems to ensure correct initialization, correct partition execution, and isolation guaranteed execution of the kernel handlers. The User lemma assures that each user mode transition in the real system is matched by a corresponding user mode transition in the ideal system without interfering with the resources that are not intended to be accessible by the partition, and vice versa. The Handler lemma assures that each complete handler execution in the real system is matched by a corresponding execution of a kernel functionality in the ideal model, and vice versa.
User/Handler lemmas were verified using pre/post conditions generated automatically based on the specification of the ideal model, the bisimulation relation, and the ARM isolation Lemmas. The pre/post conditions were transferred to the binary code analysis tool BAP to verify the bootstrap code and the kernel handlers at the assembly code level.
The model of the ideal system, the formalization of the verification procedure and the proofs of the theorems consist of 21k lines of HOL4 code. During verification process, several bugs 23
were identified and fixed, for example the registers were not sanitized after the bootstrap, some of the execution flags were not correctly restored during the context switch. They verified the entire kernel at machine code level and avoided reliance on a C compiler. This approach can transparently verify code that mix C and assembly.
• seL4 separation kernel seL4, a microkernel fully and formally verified in NICTA [30, 31] , was extended as a separation kernel for security critical domain [80] . The information flow security property was proved formally [81, 80] based on the results of verifying seL4 kernel [30, 31] .
To provide a separation kernel, they extended the seL4 API only minimally by adding a static partition-based scheduler and enforced requiring that seL4 be configured to prevent asynchronous interrupt delivery to user-space partitions which would introduce an information channel. The priority-based scheduling was changed to the partitioning scheduling that follows a static round-robin schedule between partitions, with fixed-length time slices per partition, while doing dynamic priority-based round-robin scheduling of threads within each partition.
For information flow security, they adopted an extension of von Oheimb's notion of nonleakage [82] which is a variation of intransitive noninterference [81] . Nonleakage was defined as
It states that for two arbitrary and reachable states s and t of system, if the two states agree on the private state of the separation kernel scheduler (s PS ched ∼ t), and for each entity in partition' extent in a partition set (sources n s p), the entity's state is identical in the two state s and t (s sources n s p ≈ t), then after performing n transitions from s and t, the entities of partition p in the new two states are identical (s p ∼ n t). The partition set (sources n s p) includes partitions that are permitted to send information to a specific partition p when a sequence of n transitions occurs from a state s.
The information flow theorem assures that seL4's C implementation enforces information flow security(Formula 15). Because information flow security is also preserved by refinement, it allows to prove information flow security on seL4's abstract specification and then concludes that it must hold for seL4's C implementation by the refinement relation between abstraction specification and implementation proved in [30, 31] . When proving information flow security on the abstract specification, they simplified the proof by discharging proof obligations of nonleakage,unwinding conditions, that examines individual execution steps. The unwinding condition, called confidentiality-u as following, is equivalent to nonleakage
It says that the contents of each partition p after each step depend only on the contents of the following partitions before the step: p, PSched and the currently running partition part s when it is allowed to send information to p. In other words, information may flow to p only from PSched and the current partition in accordance with the information flow policy . The information flow policy p 1 p 2 holds if the access control policy allows partition p 1 to affect any subject in p 2 's extent. This condition has been proved for the execution steps of their transition system in abstraction specification.
They stated that it was the first complete, formal, machine-checked verification of information flow security for the implementation of a general-purpose microkernel. Unlike previous proofs of information flow security for separation kernels, they verification applied to the actual 8,830 lines of C code of seL4, and so ruled out the possibility of invalidation by implementation errors in this code. The proof of information flow security was done in Isabelle/HOL by 27,756 lines of code, and required a total effort of roughly 51 person-months. This proof describes precisely how the general purpose kernel should be configured to enforce isolation and mandatory information flow control.
In [81] , they declared that the unwinding conditions for noninterference is similar to the GWVr2 policy. The GWVr2 is general enough to handle systems in which previous execution steps affect which is the entity that executes next, but defined only for deterministic systems. The exact relationship between GWVr2 and the unwinding conditions deserves further study.
• Spatial separation of hypervisors A hypervisor provides a software virtualization environment in which operating systems can run with the appearance of full access to the underlying system hardware, but in fact such access is under the complete control of the hypervisor. The hypervisor virtualizes the hardware (processor, memory, devices, etc.) for hosted operating systems. Hypervisors support COTS operating systems and legacy/diverse applications on specific operating systems. Hypervisors for safety/security critical systems have been discussed widely [83, 84] . For instance, Xtratum [85] is a typical hypervisor for safety critical embedded systems.
Similar to the separation kernel, the hypervisor mainly provides the memory separation for hosted operating systems. Address separation protects the memory regions of one execution context by preventing other context from accessing these regions. This is a crucial property -in essence requiring that disjoint source addresses spaces be mapped to disjoint destination address spaces. Separation is achieved by an address translation subsystem, and sophisticated address translation schemes use multi-level page tables. A separation kernel could employ shadow paging to isolate critical memory regions from an untrusted guest OS. The kernel maintains its own trusted version of the guest's page table, called the shadow page table. The guest is allowed to modify its page table. However, the kernel interposes on such modifications and checks that the guest's modifications do not violate memory separation. A parametric verification technique [86, 87] is able to handle separation mechanisms operating over multi-level data structures of arbitrary size and with arbitrary number of levels. They developed a parametric guarded command language (PGCL + ) for modeling hypervisors and a parametric specification formalism, PT S L + , for expressing security policies of separation mechanisms modeled in PGCL + . The separation property states that the physical addresses accessible by the guest OS must be less than the lowest address of hypervisor protected memory. Models of Xen and ShadowVisor are created in C and two properties are verified using CBMC (a model checker for C), the initial state of the system ensures separation; If the system started in a state that ensures separation, executing any of the guarded commands in the models preserves separation.
Hypervisors allow multiple guest operating systems to run on shared hardware, and offer a compelling means of improving the security and the flexibility of software systems. In [88] , the strong isolation properties between guest operating systems ensures an operating system can only read and modify memory that it owns, and its behavior is independent of the state of other operating systems. The read isolation captures the intuition that no OS can read memory that does not belong to it. The write isolation captures the intuition that an OS cannot modify memory that it does not own. The OS isolation captures the intuition that the behavior of any OS does not depend on other OSs states. They formalized in the Coq proof assistant an idealized model of a hypervisor, and formally establish that the hypervisor ensures strong isolation properties.
Xenon [89] is a high-assurance separation hypervisor built by Naval Research Laboratory based on re-engineering the Xen open-source hypervisor. The information-flow security has also been proposed for the Xenon hypervisor [90] as a the basis for formal policy-to-code modelling and evidence for a Common Criteria security evaluation. Their security policy was an independence policy [91] that is preserved by refinement. Considering that the original independence policy was defined in a purely event-based formalism that does not directly support refinement into state-rich implementations like hypervisor internals, they used the Circus language to formalize the security policy. The Xenon security policy defines separation between Low and High as the independence of Low's view from anything High might do. Low and High are domains that contain the guest operating systems hosted by Xenon. High user (guest operating system) can not only perform all possible sequences of High events, i.e., including event sequences a well-behaved user would not generate, but also arbitrarily refuse to perform any of them as well. If this kind of arbitrary behavior by the High part of the system cannot cause the Low part of the system to behave in a non-deterministic way, then High cannot influence what Low sees and no information flows from High to Low. The formal security policy model was in heuristic use for re-engineering the internal design of Xen into the internal design of Xenon. Mechanical proofs of the refinement between the Circus security policy model and the Xenon implementation have not been constructed.
Temporal Separation
Temporal separation must ensure that the service received from shared resources by the software in one partition cannot be affected by the software in another partition. This includes the performance of the resource concerned, as well as the rate, latency, jitter, and duration of scheduled access to it [38] . The temporal separation becomes critical when being applied in safety-critical systems. The scheduler of separation kernel implements temporal separation as it is responsible for assigning processor time to partitions. Temporal separation requires a two-level scheduler, partition level and process level, according to ARINC 653 standard.
The related works mainly deal with two problems for temporal separation, the schedulability analysis of two-level scheduling and correct implementation of the scheduler. The first one usually uses a compositional approach to formally specify and analyse the schedulability of realtime applications running under two-level scheduling. The recent work is discussed in [92, 93] . It considers the application not the separation kernel itself. Our survey concerns with verification of the separation kernel and the second one will be discussed here.
• Honeywell DEOS scheduler
The Honeywell Dynamic Enforcement Operating System (DEOS) is a microkernel-based real-time operating system that supports flexible Integrated Modular Avionics applications by providing both space partitioning at the process level and time partitioning at the thread level. The model checking and theorem proving approach have applied to the DEOS scheduler to analyse the temporal separation property [26, 27, 28] . 26
Honeywell had a collaboration with NASA Armes, delivering C++ source code of the DEOS scheduler to NASA for formal analysis [26, 27] . A core slice of the DEOS scheduling kernel contained 10 classes and over 1000 lines of actual code was first translated without abstraction from C++ into Promela, the input language for Spin model checker. The main aspect of DEOS is verifying was the temporal partitioning property that each thread in the kernel is guaranteed to have access to its complete CPU budget during each scheduling period. They used two approaches to analyzing the time partitioning properties in the DEOS kernel. The first was to place assertions over program variables to identify potential errors. If the model checker finds an assertion violation, the reported error trace can be simulated and it can be determined whether or not the trace is really an error. Because any value assigned to a thread's remaining budget should be smaller than the total budget for the thread, otherwise the thread would have access to use too much CPU time, they placed an assertion into the code where the value is assigned. The second approach to verifying time partitioning in the kernel is through the use of a liveness property, Idle Execution, presented by LTL. The liveness property specified as [ ](beginperiod− > (! endperiod U idle)), states that if there is slack in the system (i.e. the main thread does not have 100% CPU utilization) then the idle thread should run during every longest period. This is a necessary condition of time partitioning.
The size and complexity of this system limited them to analyzing only one configuration at a time. To overcome this limit and generalize the analysis to arbitrary configurations, they have turned to theorem proving and used the PVS theorem prover to analyze the DEOS scheduler [28] . They modelled the operations of the scheduler in PVS and the execution timeline of DEOS using a discrete time state-transition system. Properties of time partitioning (TP) were formulated as predicates on the set of states, and proved to hold for all reachable states. The corresponding PVS proof consists of the base step and the inductive step: i n i t i n v a r i a n t : LEMMA i n i t ( s ) IMPLIES TP ( s ) t r a n s i t i o n i n v a r i a n t : LEMMA TP ( p s ) AND t r a n s i t i o n ( ps , s ) IMPLIES TP ( s )
While the T P predicate was defined as: The entire collection of theories has a total 1648 lines of PVS code and 212 lemmas. In addition to the inductive proof of the time partitioning invariant, they used a feature-based technique for modeling state-transition systems and formulating inductive invariants. This technique facilitates an incremental approach to theorem proving that scales well to models of increasing complexity.
• A two-level scheduler for VxWorks kernel
In [94] , a hierarchical scheduler executed in the WindRiver VxWorks kernel has been modelled using task automata and model checked using the Times tool. The two-level hierarchical scheduler uses periodic/polling servers (PS), and inside these, fixed priority preemptive scheduling (FPPS) of periodic tasks, for integrating real-time applications. In their framework, the Global scheduler is responsible for distributing the CPU capacity to the servers (the schedulable entity of a subsystem). Servers are allocated a defined time (budget) every predefined period. They are scheduled according to the scheduling policy of the global scheduler. Each server can comprise a Local scheduler which schedules the workload inside it, i.e. its tasks, when its server is selected for execution by the global scheduler. The global and local schedulers correspond to the scheduler in the separation kernel and scheduler in the partitions respectively.
They used the task automata [95] (timed automata with tasks) supported by Times tool to model the global scheduler, event handler and each local scheduler for partitions. The event handler decouples the global scheduler from the variability of partition amount. They specified 5 respectively 4 properties in TCTL (Timed Computation Tree Logic) for the global and local scheduler. They are (1) A server S i (with index i) should never ge more than C i budget at any discrete interval (non sliding) of length P i , where the first interval starts at time 0. (2) A server S i should never get less than C i budget at any discrete interval (non sliding) of length P i , where the first interval starts at time 0, if there is unused time within this interval. (3) A server S i should always be released (inserted in the server ready-queue) according to its specified period P i . (4) A server should always be removed from the server ready-queue upon server budget depletion. (5) The highest priority server in the server ready queue should always be the current running server in the system. (6) A task t i should always be released (inserted in the task ready-queue) according to its specified period P i , OR if later, directly when its server is activated. (7) A task should always be removed from the task ready-queue upon finishing its execution. (8) The highest priority task in the task ready queue (in each server) should always be the current running task in the server, when it is active. (9) All tasks should run within their respective server.
• An ARINC653 scheduler modelled in AADL In [96] , AADL was used to model an ARINC653 hierarchical scheduler for critical systems and Cheddar to analyse the scheduling simulation on AADL specifications with hierarchical schedulers. AADL (Architecture Analysis and Design Language) is a textual and graphical language support for model-based engineering of embedded real time systems that has been approved and published as SAE Standard. Cheddar is a set of Ada packages which aims at performing analysis of real time applications. The Cheddar language allows the designer to define new schedulers into the Cheddar framework.
In their ARINC 653's two-levels hierarchical scheduling, the first level static scheduling is fixed at design time, the second scheduling level is related to the task scheduling where tasks of a given partition are scheduled with a fixed priority scheduler. In the AADL model, ARINC 653 kernel, partition, task are modelled as processor, process and thread respectively. The specific Cheddar properties were extended to the AADL model in order to describe the behavior of each AADL component in Cheddar language and apply real time scheduling analysis tools. The behavior of each scheduler is modelled as a timed automaton in Cheddar language. With the meta CASE tool Platypus, they have designed a meta-model of Ada 95 for Cheddar and a model of the Cheddar language. From these models, they generated Ada packages which are part of the Cheddar scheduling simulation engine. These Ada packages implement a Cheddar program compiler and interpreter. Then scheduling simulation analysis was performed on AADL specifications with hierarchical schedulers. 28
• A two-level scheduler for RTSJ
The Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ) is a set of interfaces and behavioral specifications that allow for real-time computer programming in the Java programming language. It was modified to allow applications to implement two-level scheduling mechanism where the first level is the RTSJ priority scheduler and the second level is under application control [97, 98] . They also verified the two-level scheduler for RTSJ using Timed Automata in the UPPAAL tool [99] . The Thread, BaseScheduler (global scheduler), an EDFScheduler(local scheduler) and other components were presented by timed automata. Five properties were verified on their model. Three of them are to check the correctness of their model: (1) a thread's priority never takes an invalid value, (2) no thread can block due to locking after it starts, and (3) the system will always select a thread to run with higher absolute preemption level (apl) than the system ceiling, unless the selected thread is currently locking a resource with higher ceiling than its apl, or is a thread that has just been released. The other two are liveness and deadlock free properties that state the system is livelock free and can never deadlock.
Summarize

Comparison of Related Works
We summarize related works on formal specification and verification of separation kernels in Tables 1. We compares seven features of them. "N/A" (Not Applicable) in the table means that some work does not concern with this aspect. The column "Target Kernel" is the object specified or verified in each work. The "Objective" shows the concerns of each work. formal specification indicates that the work concentrates on formal specifying/developing/modelling separation kernels, and formal verification on verifying separation kernels. Some works aims at these two aspects. The "Specification" indicates the formal models or properties verified in each work. The "Functionalities" means that they specify the main modules of the separation kernel. The "Formal Language" indicates that what's the formal language used when modelling or verifying the separation kernels. The "Verification Approach" indicates the formal verification approach used in "formal verification" works, and the "Development Approach" indicates how they developed their separation kernel formally. The "Tools" shows the software tools used in each work. The GWV information flow security policy proposed in Rockwell Collins has been considered as the security policy to provide evidence for the Common Criteria evaluation, and was used in verification of industrial separation kernels, such as AAMP7G microprocessor, INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel, PikeOS separation kernel. The separation security policies: infiltration, mediation and exfiltration [58] can also be presented by the GWV separation axiom [56] . GWV is at least as strong as general non-interference [62] and supports intransitive non-interference [100] , as proved in [57] . As an industrially applicable and practically proved security policy, the GWV policy is as helpful property for verifying a separation kernel and proving the policy could be considered as a trusted way for certification.
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Theorem proving vs. model checking
After surveying related works of the separation kernel, we could find that most of the verification works on spatial separation use the theorem proving approach. The reasons are (1) the separation kernel for safety and security critical systems need fully formal verification, and model checking approach is not competent because of its state space explosion problem, (2) the separation kernel usually only has thousands of lines of source code that make it is possible to be fully verified and theorem proving approach can be applied without too much cost, (3) separation properties of the separation kernel are difficult to be presented in LTL/CTL etc., which prevent the model checking approach, (4) theorem proving approach on verifying operating system kernels exhibits good results, for example, more than 140 bugs were found in the project verifying the seL4 kernel.
Different to the theorem proving approach on spatial separation, verifying the temporal separation usually uses the model checking approach. The reason is that time is difficult to be expressed by logics in the theorem provers. However, the time can be presented conveniently in model checkers, for example the timed automata in UPPAAL tools. The problem of model checking temporal separation is that size and complexity of the separation kernel limits the approach to analyzing only one configuration at a time. The global scheduler is verified with the local scheduler together, and the verification result is related with partition numbers. Honeywell has faced this problem and used the PVS theorem prover to analyze the DEOS scheduler [28] . Our opinion is that verifying temporal separation needs more study of theorem proving approach in the future.
How to develop correct separation kernel
The two primary approaches to develop correct separation kernel are (1) formal development from top level specification to low level implementation by refinement and (2) formal verification of low level implementation according to its specification. In formal methods, refinement is the verifiable transformation of high-level formal specification into low-level implementation, and then into executable code. B [73] and Z [72] are typical formal development methods for software. Correctness of models in different abstract levels and correspondence between models of two neighboring levels assure the correctness of the design. The certifiable code generation guarantees the correspondence between the low level implementation and the source code. The works [74, 70, 69, 67] employed this approach to develop separation kernels. According to successful project of formal development [13, 101] , this approach may be recognized and proved a few years later.
In the formal verification of the separation kernel, the EAL 7 of Common Criteria does not enforce the formal verification on the source code level. Therefore, many verification efforts on the separation kernel are carried out on the abstract or low level models. Establishing correspondence between the model and the source code of the implementation is typically by code review and not assured formally, for example in Common Criteria evaluation of INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel [23] . Other works, such as [24, 25, 22] , annotated the source code of separation kernels for verification. The works [81, 80, 28] translated the source code manually/automatically to formal languages in the theorem provers for reasoning. While the works [60, 18, 79] verified the separation kernel on binary or assemble code level.
As illustrated by the project of verifying seL4 kernel, fully formal verification showed better result and less certification cost (for example EAL 7 certification) [30] . Due to the feasibility and existed experiences, our opinion is to recommend fully formal verification on source code level. Formal development based on B, Z and other formal methods is recommended to develop a new separation kernel.
What's the correctness of the separation kernel
As studied in [21] , correctness property of PikeOS kernel was formulated as a simulation relation between the concrete system and an abstract model of it. As well as the functional properties, correctness properties of address translation, memory separation, techniques to handle assembly code, and assumptions on various components like the compiler, hardware and implementation policies are identified as ingredients of operating system kernel correctness. For the separation kernel, the paper [70] has summarized the separation kernel requirements according to the original definition [1] and SKPP extensions [15] , which includes functionality and security, separation and information flow, configuration, principle of least privilege, memory management, execution and scheduling, and platform considerations. We consider that properties of security, separation, information flow, memory, scheduling, etc. are typical and important correctness properties of the separation kernel, and there are still other correctness properties to be taken into account.
Relationship of key properties
The separation kernel has some key properties to proving its correctness, such as information flow security, memory separation, data separation, temporal separation, etc. As discussed in above sections, we have clarify the relationship on separation kernel among GWV policy [56] , non-infiltration, non-exfiltration, mediation [58] , original non-interference [62] , and ED's data separation properties [24, 25] . The exact relationship on separation kernel among GWV [56] , GWVr2 [65] , intransitive non-interference [100] , non-influence [82] , non-leakage [82, 80] , etc. deserves future study. On the other hand, the shared resources and communication channels, etc. among partitions will also affect the scheduling in the separation kernel. The relationship among spatial separation and temporal separation also needs further study.
Conclusion
In this paper, we surveyed the efforts on formal specification and verification of the separation kernel. It covers the concept, requirement, properties, formal model and formal verification approach. It is an overview of related works, and we aimed at presenting the framework and focuses of related works, so the detailed information were not touched. Future work includes the formal comparison of correctness properties, a formal model for the separation kernel, and efforts on verification.
